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INSURANCE AND THE ADA
Bonnie Poitras Tucker*
INTRODUCTION
This Article will examine some of the major issues involving insur-
ance coverage under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA"). I will focus primarily on insurance in the employment set-
ting (Title I), but this Article will also briefly discuss insurance issues
under Title III. I will present an overview of the current state of the
law under Titles I and III with respect to issues relating to insurance,
as interpreted by regulatory agencies and the courts, and will discuss
some current and potential areas of dispute.
The major policy issue is: to what extent, and in what manner, is the
ADA intended to have an impact on insurance coverage? In typical
law school fashion, this Article will raise many questions without pro-
viding any real answers.
I. TITLE I-INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE EMPLOYMENT SETTING
Title I of the ADA' prohibits an employer from discriminating
against a person with a disability "in regard to job application proce-
dures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment."' 2 Further, Title I prohibits an employer from "partic-
ipating in a contractual ... relationship" that would prove discrimina-
tory to an employee with a disability.3 The provision of fringe benefits
by an employer or the employer's contractor is expressly stated as fall-
ing within the coverage of Title I.
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University; J.D., University of Colorado School of Law;
B.S., Syracuse University.
This Article is based on a presentation given on January 31, 1997, at DePaul Law Review's
Symposium entitled Individual Rights and Reasonable Accommodations Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
2. Id. § 12112(a).
3. Id. § 12112(b)(2).
4. Id. This section specifically states, "such relationship includes a relationship with an em-
ployment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an em-
ployee of the covered entity, or an organization providing training and apprenticeship
programs." Id.
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Prior to discussing specific substantive issues under Title I, a few
preliminary matters must be addressed.
A. Qualifying as an Employee
The first question to be addressed is who may assert an action
against an employer to protest allegedly discriminatory insurance cov-
erage. To fall within the protection of Title I, an individual must be a
job applicant or employee of the defendant. 5 Several issues of dispute
with respect to definition of an "employee" under Title I are relevant
for insurance purposes. Independent contractors have been found not
to be employees for purposes of the ADA.6 Volunteer workers have
been held not to be employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VII"). 7 Since Congress has stated that Title I is to
follow Title VII principles, 8 the same reasoning should be held to ap-
ply under Title I.
1. Part-time Employees
A major issue is whether a part-time employee can assert a claim
against the employer to protest allegedly discriminatory health insur-
ance coverage. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), which is responsible for interpreting and enforcing Title I,
takes the position that employers may require all employees, includ-
ing employees with disabilities, to work a stated number of hours to
be eligible for health insurance benefits. 9 According to the EEOC, it
is not discriminatory to deny health insurance to part-time workers
with disabilities as long as part-time workers without disabilities are
also denied health insurance coverage. 10
In accord with this reasoning, in Tenbrink v. Federal Home Loan
Bank1 the court held that an employer who accommodated an em-
ployee with chronic fatigue syndrome by allowing her to work part-
time (less than thirty hours a week) did not violate the ADA by deny-
5. Id. § 12112(a).
6. See, e.g., Robinson v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 899 F. Supp. 848, 849 (D.N.H. 1995) (stating
that where plaintiff, an insurance agent, had a contract that stated he was an independent con-
tractor and not an employee of the defendant employer, plaintiff could not assert a cause of
action against the defendant under ADA Title 1).
7. See, e.g., Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 839 F. Supp. 372, 373 (D. Md. 1994) (holding
plaintiff volunteer fire fighters were not considered employees for purposes of Title VII).
8. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 54, 76-77, 149 (1990); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630
app. at 338 (1996).
9. Letter Re: Health Insurance, 8 NDLR 181 (EEOC June 6, 1995); Gonzales, 7 NDLR
136 (EEOC Jan. 4, 1995) (letter to the Honorable Harris Wofford).
10. Gonzalez, 7 NDLR T 136.
11. 920 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Kan. 1996).
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ing the employee medical benefits under a policy requiring any em-
ployee to work at least thirty hours a week to be eligible for group
coverage. 12 In other words, the court held that it would constitute a
reasonable accommodation to allow an employee with a disability to
work part-time, but it would not constitute a reasonable accommoda-
tion to allow that employee to receive insurance benefits. This is a
question of line drawing, of course. However, the ultimate outcome
of this reasoning is that employees with disabilities may not be able to
avail themselves of a requisite reasonable accommodation of part-
time hours since to do so may mean they have to forfeit necessary
insurance coverage. Is this logical reasoning?
2. Former Employees
Another issue is whether a former employee with a disability can
sustain a claim against the employer to protest that employer's health
insurance or disability benefits plan.
In Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc.,13 a former employee who
was still covered by his former employer's insurance plan alleged that
a cap on AIDS benefits was discriminatory under the ADA. The
Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff "neither held nor desired to
hold a position" with the company and was therefore not an employee
who could bring a claim under Title 1.14 The court stated that "Con-
gress intended to limit the protection of Title I to either employees
performing, or job applicants who apply and can perform, the essen-
tial functions of available jobs which their employers maintain. 15
Similarly, in EEOC v. CNA Insurance Cos.,16 the Seventh Circuit
held that a totally disabled former employee, who objected to the dif-
ferent levels of benefits provided in his former employer's long-term
disability plan, could not assert a Title I claim against the employer.1 7
The court rejected the EEOC's argument that the plaintiff's employ-
ment position was that of a "disability benefit recipient."'1 8 The Sev-
12. Id. at 1164.
13. 89 F.3d 1523, 1524 (11th Cir. 1996).
14. Id. at 1526.
15. Id. at 1527.
16. 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996).
17. Id. at 1040.
18. Id. at 1043-44. The court stated:
All employees-the perfectly healthy, the physically disabled, and the mentally dis-
abled-had a plan that promised them long-term benefits from the onset of disability
until age 65 if their problem was physical, and long-term benefits for two years if the
problem was mental or nervous. This may or may not be an enlightened way to do
things, but it was not discriminatory in the usual sense of the term.
Id. at 1044 (citations omitted).
19971
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enth Circuit reasoned that collecting her benefit checks did not
constitute a job function, and since the plaintiff had no job functions,
she was not an employee or job applicant covered by Title 1.19 Thus,
the plaintiff was held to lack standing to assert a claim against her
former employer under Title 1.20 In Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co.,21 the Sixth Circuit followed similar reasoning.
In Northen v. City of Chicago,22 the court reached a contrary result.
In that case, Chicago police officers receiving disability pensions from
the city alleged that the city violated Title I when it amended its em-
ployee benefit plan with respect to their benefits.23 The court rejected
the city's argument that Title I does not apply to former employees.24
Rather, the court held that retirement benefits are within the "com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" covered by
Title 1.25 Further, the court found that there must only be an "em-
ployment relationship" for an individual to file an action under Title I;
it is not necessary that the plaintiff be an "employee" per se.26 Thus,
the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
complaint.27
In addition, in Graboski v. Guiliani,28 the court held that the plain-
tiffs, who were retired due to their disabilities, could sue their former
employer under Title I to protest the employer's refusal to permit dis-
ability retirees to receive supplemental benefits that were to be
awarded to employees who retired for nondisability-related reasons.2 9
19. Id. at 1044; see also Foote v. Folks, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Ga. 1994). In Foote, the
court ruled that a woman with AIDS lacked standing to sue her ex-husband's former employer
under Title I to challenge the employer's refusal to provide coverage for treatment of AIDS-
related illnesses. 864 F. Supp. at 1329. The court stated that the woman's claim fell outside the
"zone of interest" contemplated by the ADA, since the plaintiff was neither an employee or
former employee of, nor a job applicant for a position in, the employer's business. Id.
20. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d at 1045.
21. 99 F.3d 181, 186-87 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated, 6 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 547 (6th Cir.
1997) (holding that a former employee was not a qualified individual with a disability for stand-
ing to sue under the ADA where at the time she could perform essential functions of her job, she
was not disabled, and at the time her benefits were terminated, she could no longer perform her
job). It should be noted that after this presentation was given and the Article written, the Sixth
Circuit vacated its 1996 opinion and has scheduled the case to be heard en banc. Oral argument
is scheduled for June 11, 1997.
22. 841 F. Supp. 234 (N.D. 111. 1993).
23. Id. at 235.
24. Id. at 236.
25. Id. (citation omitted). Specifically, the court noted that the "Seventh Circuit has held that
retirement benefits are within the 'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment' covered under Title VII." Id. (citation omitted).
26. Id. (citation omitted).
27. Id.
28. 937 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
29. Id. at 267.
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The employer, the City of New York, argued that the plaintiffs could
not assert a Title I claim because they were no longer employees of
the city.30 As the court put it, the plaintiffs argued "that once plain-
tiffs retired on the basis of disability, the ADA no longer requires that
they be treated evenhandedly."' 31 In rejecting that reasoning, the
court stated:
Such a crabbed view of the ADA's coverage would undermine the
[ADA's] unambiguous remedial purpose. Title I of the ADA ex-
pressly prohibits discrimination in the provision of fringe bene-
fits .... As certain fringe benefits (such as pensions and health
insurance continuation) are meaningful only post-employment, it is
only logical that the statute's coverage reaches the period when the
employment benefits are to be reaped. 32
The Graboski court also noted that the definition of an "employee"
under the ADA is the same as that.under Title VII and was intended
to be given the same meaning as the Title VII definition.33 The
Graboski court cited numerous cases holding that under Title VII
"'discrimination related to or arising out of an employment relation-
ship, whether or not the person discriminated against is an employee
at the time of the discriminatory conduct' is actionable. '34
Other courts have held that employees who became totally disabled
and were unable to work could file suit against their employers for
allegedly discriminatory provisions in insurance or long-term disability
plans. In Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Whole-
saler's Association of New England, Inc. ,35 the First Circuit held that
an individual with AIDS who was totally disabled and could no longer
work had standing to bring an action alleging that his employer vio-
lated Title I because the employer's insurance benefits for AIDS-re-
lated illnesses were more limited than benefits for other illnesses.36
30. Id. at 265-66.
31. Id. at 266.
32. Id. (citations omitted).
33. Id. (citation omitted). With respect to the fact that ADA Title I is to follow Title VII
principles, see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 54, 76, 149 (1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. at 338
(1996).
34. 937 F. Supp. at 266. The court noted, however, that some courts, particularly the Fourth
and Seventh Circuits, "reject the view that Title VII covers former employees." Id. at 266 n.12.
35. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
36. Id. at 17-18; see also Schroeder v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. CA-93-M-2433, 1994
WL 909636 (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 1994) (stating that the plaintiff could assert a claim under Title I
against his former employer to protest the termination of his long-term disability benefits after
30 months due to the fact that his disability was mental rather than physical).
Other courts have held that plaintiffs who have claimed total disability for other purposes,
such as in applications for disability benefits, are not "otherwise qualified individuals with disa-
bilities" entitled to assert claims under Title I, however. See, e.g., McNemar v. The Disney Store,
Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that an individual who swore that he was totally
1997]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Courts recognize that former employees can assert claims against their
former employers with respect to issues other than insurance, such as
wrongful discharge or wrongful refusal to reinstate an employee who
ceased working due to disability but who is no longer disabled. 37
These types of cases differ from the insurance and disability benefits
cases in that, in cases involving wrongful discharge or wrongful failure
to reinstate, the plaintiffs are claiming that "but for" their former em-
ployers' discriminatory practices they would be active employees of
those employers. Nevertheless, it is at least arguable that an employ-
ment relationship of sorts exists between employers and former em-
ployees who are receiving insurance or disability benefits from those
former employers. The EEOC takes the position that that relation-
ship, in and of itself, is sufficient for Title I purposes.
Further, with respect to long-term disability plans, the EEOC ar-
gues that "'most long[-]term disability benefits are reserved for those
who are unable to hold any substantial employment for which they are
qualified,"' and thus if individuals who are no longer actually em-
ployed are unable to file suit against their former employers for dis-
criminatory treatment in disability plans "'virtually no employee
could ever challenge discrimination in the provision of long-term disa-
bility benefits."' 38 The EEOC's reasoning was expressly rejected by
the Sixth Circuit in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.39
Currently, therefore, whether former employees may sue their for-
mer employers for allegedly discriminatory provisions in insurance or
long-term disability plans remains an issue of dispute. Again, this is
an issue of line drawing. However, treating fomer employees in this
disabled in applications for social security disability benefits and for exemption from repayment
of educational benefits was estopped from filing suit under Title I to protest his allegedly dis-
criminatory dismissal from employment); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477,1482 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that an employee who represented that she was completely disabled for all work-
related purposes was estopped from claiming she was not totally disabled and thus from filing
suit under the ADA); Esfahani v. Medical College, 919 F. Supp. 832, 835-36 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(holding first that after employee became totally disabled, he lacked standing to assert that diag-
noses-based differentiations in his employer's disability plan violated Title I and holding second
that employee did have standing, however, to assert that while he was working, prior to becom-
ing totally disabled, the employer's disability plan violated Title I). An in-depth analysis of this
issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
37. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Legal Servs. Corp., 932 F. Supp. 49, 50 (D.P.R. 1996) (noting that
"the ADA would be of little use to wrongfully discharged plaintiffs if they could not invoke the
law's protection"); Lundstedt v. City of Miami No. 93-1402-CIV, 1995 WL 852443, at *6 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 11, 1995) (holding that an employee who retired due to a disability could still be eligible
under the ADA for the employer's allegedly discriminatory failure to reinstate him to his prior
position once his disability was eliminated).
38. Parker v. Metro. Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 186 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated, 6 Am. Disabilities Cas.
(BNA) 547 (6th Cir. 1997).
39. Id. at 186-87.
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manner clearly seems to defeat the purpose and spirit of the ADA by
refusing to allow these employees, who have become unable to work
due to their disabilities, to assert ADA claims against their former
employers with respect to insurance benefits those former employees
are currently receiving or are entitled to receive due to their former
employment relationship.
B. The Substantive Law
Section 501(c) of the ADA provides that insurers may underwrite,
classify, or administer risks that are consistent with state law and may
establish or observe the terms of bona fide benefit plans that are con-
sistent with state law, as long as such insurance programs or benefit
plans are not utilized as a subterfuge to circumvent the intent of the
ADA.40 The legislative history of the ADA notes that insurers may
limit coverage based on "classification of risk[s]" and may refuse to
insure, limit insurance, or charge a rate differential based on an indi-
vidual's disability when such practice is "based on sound actuarial
principles or is related to actual or reasonably anticipated experi-
ence."'41 If an insurance provision is based on sound actuarial princi-
ples, it will not constitute a subterfuge to circumvent the ADA.42 The
subterfuge language is the key to analyzing whether an insurance plan
violates the ADA.
1. Disability-Based Distinctions
Not all health-related distinctions discriminate on the basis of disa-
bility; only disability-based distinctions can be discriminatory. 43 Thus,
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994); see 28 C.F.R. § 36.212 (1996).
41. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136-37 (1990). While disability-based distinctions based
on legitimate actuarial standards may be permissible under the ADA, an employer cannot ex-
clude an employee with a disability from its insurance coverage. An employer is required under
ADA Title I to provide employees with disabilities with equal access to insurance coverage. In
Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Tex. 1996), the insurance carrier for
the employees of a retail store raised insurance premiums partly because one store employee,
Anderson, developed AIDS and had a history of cancer. To avoid rising premiums, the em-
ployer sought to change its health insurance provider to one that the employer knew would not
provide coverage to Anderson. Id. at 770. The court also held that unless the employer could
show that providing Anderson with equal access to health insurance would constitute an undue
hardship, which the court defined as "a concept approaching financial ruin," the employer would
be found to have violated the ADA. Id. at 781. The court held that the employer's argument
that the ADA permits disability-based distinctions based on actuarial risks was irrelevant since
Anderson was not subject to a disability-based distinction in coverage but was denied coverage
altogether. Id.
42. See EEOC Interim Guidance on Application of ADA to Health Insurance, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 109, at E-3 (June 9, 1993) [hereinafter Interim Guidance].
43. See id. at E-1.
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the first issue to resolve when determining whether a term or provi-
sion in a health insurance policy constitutes a subterfuge and, thus,
violates Title I, is to determine whether it makes a disability-based
distinction." The EEOC has provided explicit guidance on what con-
stitutes a "disability-based distinction. '45
First, the EEOC opines that the following types of provisions in a
health insurance plan do not constitute disability-based distinctions
and thus do not violate Title I:
1. "[B]road distinctions, which apply to the treatment of a multi-
tude of dissimilar conditions and which constrain individuals both with
and without disabilities, are not distinctions based on a disability. 46
Examples include plans that provide fewer benefits for "eye care" or
"mental/nervous" conditions than for other conditions. 47 These are
broad distinctions that affect both disabled and nondisabled individu-
als-both groups require eye care and may have mental or nervous
conditions; thus, they are not disability-based distinctions-even
though they may have a greater impact on some people with disabili-
ties, such as people who are blind or mentally ill.48 Consequently, the
EEOC opines that such distinctions do not violate Title 1. 49 In this
regard, the EEOC explains that only disparate treatment, or inten-
tional discrimination, in the context of insurance coverage will violate
the ADA.50 Distinctions in health insurance plans that have a dispa-
rate impact on people with disabilities do not violate the Act.5 1
In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,52 the court followed
the EEOC's reasoning in holding that an employer did not violate
Title I by virtue of the fact that its health insurance plan did not pay
for infertility treatments. The district court held that infertility is not a
covered disability under the ADA, and thus the distinction applied to
44. Id. at E-1.
45. Id. at E-2. Note that the EEOC's Interim Guidance does not address long-term disability
plans, pension plans, or life insurance plans, but only health insurance plans.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. This is in accord with cases decided under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See,
e.g., Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 708-10 (3d Cir. 1979) (concluding that section 504 does not
require that the same level of benefits be provided for inpatient hospital treatment of mental
illness as that provided for inpatient treatment of physical illness); Doe v. Devine, 545 F. Supp.
576, 585 (D.D.C. 1982) (concluding that cutbacks in mental health benefits but not physical
health benefits did not violate section 504), aff'd on other grounds, 703 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
49. Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-2.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 915 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affid, 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
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both persons with and without disabilities and was not a disability-
based distinction.53 The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 54
2. "Blanket pre-existing condition clauses" and "[u]niversal limits
or exclusions from coverage of all experimental drugs and treatments,
or all 'elective surgery,"' are not disability-based distinctions and thus
do not violate the ADA.55
3. "[C]overage limits on medical procedures that are not exclu-
sively, or nearly exclusively, utilized for the treatment of a particular
disability" are not disability-based distinctions and thus do not violate
the ADA.56 This is true even though such limits may have a greater
impact on some people with disabilities. Thus, for example, a limit on
the number of blood transfusions for which an insurer will pay is not
disability-based, even though the limit might have a greater impact on
persons with hemophilia.5 7
The EEOC also provides guidance on what type of provision does
constitute a disability-based distinction in a health insurance plan that
may be found to violate the ADA.58 The EEOC explains that a term
or provision is "disability based" if it singles out:
a. "a particular disability (e.g., deafness, AIDS, schizophrenia);"
b. "a discrete group of disabilities (e.g., cancers, muscular dystro-
phies, kidney diseases);" or
c. "disability in general (e.g., non-coverage of all conditions that
substantially limit a major life activity)." 59
The first issue that must be determined when deciding whether a
disability-based distinction is being made, therefore, is whether a dis-
tinction singles out a covered disability under the ADA. This requires
us to determine whether a physical or mental condition is recognized
as a covered disability under the ADA. Although a lengthy discussion
53. Id. at 111.
54. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996); see infra notes 68-72 and
accompanying text (discussing whether infertility is a disability).
55. Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-2; see also Gonzales, 6 NDLR 395 (EEOC Nov.
16, 1994) (letter to the Honorable Herb Klein) (blanket preexisting clauses that exclude cover-
age for conditions that predate an individual's eligibility for benefits are not disability-based
distinctions). Note, however, that the EEOC opines that a preexisting condition clause that
applies only to treatment for one specific disability, as opposed to a clause prohibiting treatment
for all preexisting conditions, is a disability-based distinction that may violate the ADA. Interim
Guidance, supra note 42, at E-2.
56. Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-2.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
1997]
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of this topic is beyond the scope of this presentation, 60 a brief defini-
tion of the interpretive problem will be provided.
An individual is disabled under the ADA if he or she has a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, is
regarded as having such an impairment, or has a record of having such
an impairment.61 The issue, therefore, is whether the individual's real,
former, or perceived physical or mental impairment substantially lim-
its a major life activity.
Some impairments, such as deafness, blindness, and schizophrenia,
obviously substantially limit one or more of an individual's major life
activities. Other impairments, epilepsy, for example, may or may not
constitute a covered disability, depending on whether a major life ac-
tivity of the individual is impacted. The EEOC notes that epilepsy is
an impairment but is not a per se disability under Title I since "an
individual with epilepsy is [only] covered by the ADA if the epilepsy
currently substantially limits a major life activity. ' 62 It is recognized
that "[e]pilepsy affects individuals differently. Thus, it must be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis whether an individual's epilepsy sub-
stantially limits a major life activity. '63
a. Reproduction-Infertility
Numerous issues and disputes have arisen with respect to what con-
stitutes a covered disability under the ADA. For example, the
EEOC's Title I regulations provide that pregnancy is not a disability
under the ADA.64 Several courts have agreed with that determina-
tion.65 There is a split of authority, however, as to whether medical
conditions arising as a result of pregnancy can constitute disabilities. 66
60. For an in-depth analysis of this issue, see 2 BONNIE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN,
LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW 21:1-21:46
(1991 & Supp. 1996) (discussing who qualifies as disabled).
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A), (B), (C) (1994) (emphasis added).
62. Letter Re: Health Insurance, 8 NDLR 9 181 (EEOC June 6, 1995).
63. Id.; see also Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1391 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 app. at 338-41 (1996).
65. See, e.g., Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(holding that pregnancy and related medical conditions, absent unusual circumstances, are not
physical impairments covered by the ADA); Byerly v. Herr Foods, Inc., 61 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 42, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (same).
66. Compare Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that pregnancy
related disorders such as spotting, dizziness, and nausea-symptoms of a high-risk pregnancy-
can constitute disabilities under the ADA), and Garrett v. Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trust-
ees, No. 95-C-7341, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10194, at *7 (N.D. I11. July 19, 1996) (allowing a
plaintiff to proceed with her claim that morning sickness constitutes a disability under the ADA),
with Jessie v. Carter Health Care Ctr. Inc., 926 F. Supp. 613, 616 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (stating that a
plaintiff who was advised as a result of her pregnancy not to lift more than 25 pounds did not
[Vol. 46:915
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Similarly, there is a split of authority as to whether infertility, which is
tangentially related to pregnancy, constitutes a disability under the
ADA.67
As previously noted, in Kraue68 the court held, contrary to the de-
cisions of several other courts,69 that reproduction is not a "major life
activity" under the ADA, and thus impairments relating to reproduc-
tion, such as infertility, are not covered disabilities.70 Moreover, the
court held that a distinction in an insurance plan refusing to cover
treatment for infertility is not a disability-based distinction that vio-
lates the ADA.71 Those courts holding that reproduction is a major
life activity, and that therefore infertility does constitute a covered dis-
ability under the ADA, would presumably have reached a contrary
result and held that the insurance provision constituted a disability-
based distinction.
Therefore, before one can determine whether a distinction or ex-
emption in a health care plan constitutes a disability-based distinction
in violation of the ADA, one must first determine whether it applies
to a covered disability.
C. Physical-Mental Health Distinctions
A major dispute with respect to disability-based distinctions in-
volves health insurance plans that provide greater coverage for physi-
cal health care than for mental health care. The EEOC has opined
that distinctions in benefits between treatment for physical and mental
health conditions are not disability-based because they apply "to the
have a disability under the ADA), and Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F.
Supp. 474 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff who suffered from backaches and nausea as a
result of her pregnancy did not have a disability under the ADA).
67. Compare Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 804 (N.D. I11. 1996) (holding that
infertility is a disability under the ADA because it substantially limits the major life activity of
reproduction), Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Univs. for Northeastern
Univ., 911 F. Supp. 316, 323 (N.D. I11. 995) (stating that "[pilaintiff's allegation that her infertil-
ity is a physical impairment that substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction states
a claim under the ADA"), and Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 586 (D. Me. 1995) (repro-
duction constitutes a major life activity under the ADA), with Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med.
Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 111 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affd, 95 F,3d 674 (8th Cir.. 1996) (holding that
infertility does not constitute a disability under the ADA because reproduction is not a major
life activity).
68. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
69. Krauel, 915 F. Supp. at 107-08.
70. Id. at 108.
71. Id.
1997]
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treatment of a multitude of dissimilar conditions and ... constrain
individuals both with and without disabilities. '72
The EEOC apparently has not decided if the same rationale applies
with respect to long-term disability plans. In EEOC v. CNA Insur-
ance COS., 7 3 the EEOC filed suit on behalf of an individual who
claimed that her employer's long-term disability plan violated the
ADA by providing benefits for physical disabilities until age sixty-five,
while providing benefits for mental and nervous disorders for only
two years. 74 The EEOC had unsuccessfully sought a preliminary in-
junction until it had investigated the merits of the claim. 75 Thus, the
EEOC did not have the opportunity to decide the issue in the context
of that case, and to date it has not decided the issue in any other
context.
In other cases, however, differentials between physical and mental
health care in long-term disability plans have been recognized to vio-
late-or to possibly violate-Title I. In Harris v. City of Phoenix,76
the parties entered into a consent decree with respect to the claim that
Phoenix's long-term disability policy violated the ADA by offering
coverage to eligible employees with physical disabilities until age sev-
enty-five, while limiting coverage to eligible employees with mental
disabilities to twenty-four months. 77 Pursuant to the consent decree,
the city agreed to eliminate the distinction, to reinstate the plaintiff's
long-term disability benefits retroactively, and to pay the plaintiff's at-
torneys' fees.78
The plaintiff in Harris argued that long-term disability insurance is
different from health insurance in that disability benefits, unlike
health insurance benefits, are paid out as a percentage of the em-
ployee's salary and not on an individual claim basis. Thus, in Harris,
the plaintiff argued that differences between benefits for mental and
physical disabilities in long-term disability policies do violate Title I
even if such differentials in health insurance policies do not violate
Title 1.79
72. Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-2. Note, however, that an employer could not selec-
tively apply a nondisability-based insurance distinction only to persons with disabilities, such as
by applying a plan limit on "eye care" only to an employee seeking treatment for a vision disabil-
ity. Id.
73. 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996).
74. Id. at 1041.
75. Id. at 1041-42.
76. No. CIV-95-0361 (D. Ariz. May 1, 1996) (consent decree).
77. Id. at 1.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Id. at 1.
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In Esfahani v. Medical College of Pennsylvania,80 the plaintiff al-
leged that the distinction between physical and mental benefits in his
employer's long-term disability plan was "arbitrary, discriminatory
and without scientific basis."' 81 The court found that the plaintiff had
"adequately alleged" that the plan's distinctions between the types of
benefits "are not based on legitimate grounds" 8 and remanded the
case for further proceedings.8 3 The Esfahani court recognized that
distinctions between mental and physical health care benefits in long-
term disability plans may, in some circumstances, violate Title 1.84
The analysis with respect to whether distinctions between physical
and mental health benefits in long-term disability plans violate the
ADA is problematic. On the one hand, it can be argued that only
people who are disabled require and receive long-term disability ben-
efits, and therefore all distinctions made with respect to such benefits
are disability-based and will violate the Act unless supported by actu-
arial data showing the necessity for such distinctions. 85 On the other
hand, it can be argued that the ADA does not require that benefits
provided to one group of people with disabilities must be provided to
another group of people with disabilities, and therefore any distinc-
tions made between benefits for persons with different types of disa-
bilities are not discriminatory in violation of the Act.8 6 It will be
interesting to see how the courts, and the regulatory agencies, ulti-
mately balance these conflicting approaches.
As the Seventh Circuit noted in EEOC v. CNA Insurance Cos.,87
"the issue of parity among physical and mental health benefits is one
that is still in the legislative arena. '88 The legislature has now ad-
dressed this issue in the recently enacted Mental Health Parity Act of
1996.89 The Mental Health Parity Act, which is to take effect on Janu-
ary 1, 1998, 90 will apply to group health plans.91 It will prevent life-
80. 919 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
81. Id. at 836.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court denied portions of this motion. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-3 (stating that one of the ways that a defendant
can show that a "challenged disability-based insurance distinction is not a subterfuge" is by
presenting actuarial data to show that the distinction is unnecessary).
86. For a discussion of this issue, see TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 60, at 21:1-21:46.
87. 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996).
88. Id. at 1044.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (1996).
90. Id. This section applies with respect to group health plan years beginning on or after
January 1, 1998.
91. Id.
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time caps from being imposed on mental health benefits in a group
health plan if physical benefits are not similarly capped in that plan.92
Similarly, the Act will prevent a group health plan from placing an-
nual limits on mental health benefits unless the plan imposes the same
annual limits on substantially all medical and surgical benefits covered
by the plan.93 The Act does, however, provide an exemption for small
employers having less than fifty-one employees. 94 Moreover, the Act
does not apply if its application would cause the cost of insurance to
increase by more than one percent.95
The Mental Health Parity Act does little to limit disparities between
physical and mental health benefits. It does not even apply if insur-
ance costs would rise more than one percent.96 Even when it does
apply, the Act merely prevents large employers that have insurance
policies providing both physical and mental health benefits from hav-
ing lifetime or annual caps-in terms of years or dollars-on mental
health benefits that are not also imposed on physical health benefits.97
What the Act does not cover is significant.
First, the Act does not require employers to provide any mental
health benefits for their employees. 98 The Act expressly does not re-
quire "a group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in
connection with such a plan) to provide any mental health benefits." 99
Thus, an employer could maintain an insurance plan that covers physi-
cal impairments but provides no mental health benefits at all. Alter-
natively, an employer could arguably have two separate health
plans-one providing benefits for physical impairments and the sec-
ond providing benefits for mental health care. If the employer has
92. "If the plan or coverage does not include an aggregate lifetime limit on substantially all
medical and surgical benefits, the plan or coverage may not impose any aggregate lifetime limit
on mental health benefits." Id. § 300gg-5(a)(1)(A).
93. "If the plan or coverage does not include an annual limit on substantially all medical and
surgical benefits, the plan or coverage may not impose any annual limit on mental health bene-
fits." Id. § 300gg-5(a)(2)(A).
94. Id. § 300gg-5(c)(1). The Act defines a small employer as "an employer who employed an
average of at least 2 but no more than 50 employees on business days during the preceding
calendar year and who employs at least 2 employees on the first day of the plan year." Id.
§ 300gg-91(e)(4).
95. Id. § 300gg-5(c)(2). "This section shall not apply with respect to group health plan (or
health insurance coverage offered in connection with a group health plan) if the application ...
results in an increase in the cost under the plan (or for such coverage) of at least 1 percent." Id.
96. Id.
97. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(b)(1) (providing that nothing in the Act shall be construed as
requiring a group health plan to provide any mental health benefits).
99. Id.
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two separate plans, it is arguable that the Mental Health Parity Act
would not apply.100
Second, the Act expressly provides that it does not govern with re-
spect to any terms or conditions relating to mental health benefits
other than lifetime caps relating to benefits or annual limits.'01 Thus,
the Act provides that it does not cover issues such as cost sharing,
limits on numbers of visits or days of coverage, or requirements per-
taining to medical necessity for mental health treatment. 0 2 Accord-
ingly, an employer's group health plan could cover up to a certain
percentage (say, fifty percent) of the costs of mental health care, even
though the plan might cover a higher percentage (say, one hundred
percent) of the cost of physical health care. The percentage goes to
cost sharing and is not a lifetime annual cap in terms of years or
dollars.
In actual effect, therefore, the Mental Health Parity Act is likely to
do little or nothing to resolve the issue of parity among physical and
mental health benefits. 103
D. Benefit Caps
Another issue with respect to disability-based distinctions involves
annual benefit caps. The EEOC takes the position that yearly or life-
time benefit caps applied to all health or disability plan participants
are permissible since such caps are not used almost exclusively with
respect to treatment for a particular disability and thus are not disabil-
ity-based. 1°4 For example, a policy that establishes a maximum bene-
fit of $20,000 per year for medical care would not violate the ADA. 0 5
An annual or lifetime cap tied to a specific disabling condition, such as
100. See id. §§ 300gg-5(a)(1), (2) (providing that the Act only applies "in the case of a group
health plan ... that provides both medical and surgical benefits and mental health benefits").
101. Id. § 300gg-5(b)(2).
102. Id.
103. Nor will the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 702(a)(2)(A), (B) (1996)), assist in ensuring
health insurance benefits for mental illness. 110 Stat. 1936. Section 702(a)(1) of that Act pro-
vides that a group health plan may not establish rules for eligibility or continued eligibility based
on, inter alia, health status, "mental condition (including both physical and mental illnesses),"
medical history, or genetic information. Id. While this proviso will prevent some forms of dis-
crimination in the insurance context against persons with disabilities, the Act does not require
group plans to "provide particular benefits," nor does the Act prevent group plans "from estab-
lishing limitations or restrictions on the amount, level, extent, or nature of the benefits or cover-
age for similarly situated individuals." Id.
104. Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-2.
105. See id. (explaining, through an example, that as long as the "cap does not single out a
specific disability, discrete group of disabilities, or disability in general," such a cap is not a
disability-based distinction that violates the ADA).
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AIDS, however, is likely to violate the ADA, according to the
EEOC.106
Much of the litigation in this area has involved allegations that an
employer enacted a lower cap on benefits for AIDS-related illnesses
than for other catastrophic diseases or illnesses. 0 7 The EEOC first
dealt with this issue in the 1993 case of Donaghey v. Mason Tenders
District Council Trust Fund.0 8 The charging party alleged that the
respondent construction union violated the ADA when, on July 1,
1991, it "changed its health insurance plan to explicitly exclude
payment for expenses arising from HIV infections, AIDS, and/or
AIDS[-]related complexes."'1 9 The New York District Director of the
EEOC found that the ADA had been violated.1 0
The EEOC has entered into numerous settlement agreements or
consent agreements that have provided relief to individuals whose
benefits for HIV-related conditions were limited and in which insurers
agreed to change their practices and policies with respect to AIDS
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., EEOC v. Lee Data Corp., No. CV-94-3875 (C.D. Cal. Settlement Order entered
Oct. 10, 1995) (the company agreed to raise a $100,000 cap on lifetime health care benefits for
treatment of AIDS related illnesses to $1 million; the company also agreed to pay approximately
$115,000 in unpaid medical expenses and $5,000 in compensatory damages to the estate of the
insured); EEOC v Laborers Dist. Council Bldg. & Constr. Health & Welfare Fund, No. CA-94-
3971 (E.D. Pa. Consent Agreement entered into Dec. 23, 1994) (approving a consent agreement
whereby the defendant agreed to pay the AIDS Law Project of Pennsylvania $42,500 on behalf
of one plaintiff, pay another plaintiff's medical bills in the amount of $1,209, to delete its maxi-
mum benefit limitation of $10,000 with respect to AIDS-related illnesses and to provide the
same coverage for AIDS-related illnesses as it does for other major medical illnesses); EEOC v.
Connecticut Refining Co., 4 NDLR $ 1 (April 13, 1994) (conciliation agreement announced
March 1994 whereby the defendant agreed to lift a cap placed on insurance coverage for AIDS-
related expenses); EEOC v. Allied Servs. Div. Welfare Fund, 4 NDLR 9 1 (October 27, 1993)
(settlement entered into in September 1993 whereby the defendant agreed to rescind a $5,000
lifetime cap it had placed on AIDS-related expenses); Estate of Kadinger v. IBEW Local 110, 63
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42 (D. Minn. 1993) (the defendant agreed to pay $100,000 to the
plaintiff's estate and to remove the cap on AIDS benefits). Additionally, in 1994, the Gage
Company in Michigan agreed to delete its $5,000 benefit limitation relating to AIDS-related
illnesses from its medical reimbursement plan. EEOC v. The Gage Co., 4 NDLR 8 (EEOC
Aug. 17, 1994).
108. Text of EEOC District Director's Determination in Charge No. 160-93-0419, Jan. 28, 1993,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at D-1 (Feb. 9, 1993).
109. Id.
110. Id. Subsequently, a district court denied Mason Tenders' motion for summary judgment.
The court rejected Mason Tenders' argument that, as a self-insured, union-management welfare
fund, it is not an employer and thus is not subject to the ADA. In an oral opinion, the court
"agreed that there was 'no evidence' that Congress meant to exclude such plans from ADA
coverage and ... rejected the fund's claim that ERISA preempted such coverage." The Disabil-
ity Law Reporter Service, December 1993, at 18 (citing Mason Tenders v. Donaghey, No. 93-
CIV-1154 (JES) (S.D.N.Y. November 19, 1993) (Sprizzo, J., oral opinion)).
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coverage.11' Under the EEOC's guidelines, such restrictions are
clearly disability-based distinctions that must be analyzed to see if
they constitute an impermissible subterfuge to violate the ADA.
While the EEOC has been active in this area, to date the courts
have not really addressed the question of whether such limits violate
the Act. The EEOC's analysis is well reasoned and in accord with the
intent and spirit of the ADA, however. It is difficult to envision most
courts rejecting that analysis.
E. Disability and Service Retirement Plans
Another significant issue involves distinctions in employee benefits
between service and retirement plans. As defined by the EEOC, a
disability retirement plan "provides a lifetime income for an employee
who becomes unable to work because of illness or injury, without re-
gard to the employee's age." 12 A service retirement plan "provides a
lifetime income to employees who have reached a minimum age
stated in the plan (most commonly age 60 or age 65) and/or who have
completed specified years of service with the employer. '11 3
The EEOC opines that an employer does not violate ADA Title I
when it only offers a service retirement plan and not a disability retire-
ment plan, as long as the service retirement plan treats persons cov-
ered by the ADA in the same manner as other employees. 114 This is
because neither plan makes distinctions based on disability. A service
retirement plan is available to all employees who have attained a
stated number of years of service, regardless of whether an employee
has a disability."15 In addition, a disability retirement plan is available
to everyone who becomes unable to work due to injury or illness."16
The EEOC further opines that, if an employer does provide both a
disability retirement plan and a service retirement plan, the employer
would not be violating Title I if its disability retirement plan provided
lower levels of benefits than the service retirement plan provided."17
The EEOC offers the following examples of how the two plans
might differ:
111. See supra note 107 (citing the various settlement and consent agreements).
112. EEOC Notice, Questions and Answers About Disability and Service Retirement Plans
Under the ADA, No. 915.002, at 1, May 11, 1995 (LRP Publications) (on file with the DePaul
Law Review).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id. at 2-3.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id. at 2.
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[A] service retirement plan might enable any employee with 20 or
more years of service to retire with an annuity equal to 50% of the
individual's highest annual compensation. But, the disability retire-
ment plan, payable when illness or injury prevents the individual
from continuing work, might provide an annuity equal only to 45%
of the individual's highest annual compensation;...
service retirees might receive periodic increases (for example, based
on inflation or an increased return on invested pension funds) while
disability retirees remain at a fixed benefit level;...
a service retirement plan might disregard outside earnings while a
disability retirement plan contains an outside earnings offset
provision. 118
According to the EEOC, none of the preceding examples would
violate the ADA because service retirement plans and disability re-
tirement plans are two separate benefits that serve different purposes
and thus need not provide the same level of benefits.1 9
The EEOC's reasoning was followed in Castellano v. City of New
York,' 20 where the court found that the city did not violate the ADA
by providing greater benefits to police officers who retired after
twenty years of service than for those who retired due to disability. 12'
Similarly, in Graboski v. Guiliani,122 the court also followed the
EEOC's reasoning when it held that fire fighters who retired under a
disability plan were not entitled to share in increased benefits from
pension fund investments that were available to fire fighters receiving
benefits under a retirement plan.123
Once again, this is a question of line drawing. Is it appropriate
under the ADA for an employer to treat people who retire due to
disability in a different manner than the employer treats people who
retire due to age or years of service? To this commentator, the dis-
tinction appears valid.
F. Dependent Coverage
The final issue with respect to disability-based distinctions involves
dependent coverage. An employer-provided insurance plan that pro-
vides coverage for an employee's dependents falls within Title 1.1.24
Thus, the same principles that apply under Title I to insurance cover-
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 946 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
121. Id.
122. 937 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
123. Id. at 269-70.
124. See, e.g., Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-3.
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age for employees also apply to coverage for dependents. 125 Accord-
ingly, a provision in a health insurance plan that limits dependent
coverage based on disability would constitute a disability-based dis-
tinction that may violate the ADA.
The EEOC opines, however, that the ADA does not require that an
employer provide the same level or scope of health insurance for de-
pendents that it provides for employees. 126 Thus, the EEOC opines
that an employer-sponsored health insurance plan could permissibly
provide prescription drug coverage for employees but not for depen-
dents or could specify a higher benefit cap for employees than for
dependents. 127 The EEOC's reasoning appears sound and in accord
with Title I's purpose of protecting employees and job applicants from
discriminatory treatment.
G. Subterfuge
As previously explained, an insurance or benefit plan cannot be a
subterfuge to circumvent the ADA's purposes. 28 What conduct or
policies will be held to constitute a "subterfuge" to circumvent the
intent of the ADA is a matter of interpretation. The EEOC has de-
fined "subterfuge" as a "disability-based disparate treatment that is
not justified by the risk or costs associated with the disability.' 29 The
EEOC suggests several ways to prove that a challenged disability-
based distinction is not a subterfuge. According to the EEOC, a disa-
bility-based distinction is not a subterfuge if:
1. the defendant can "prove that it has not engaged in the disabil-
ity-based disparate treatment alleged;"1 30 or
2. "the disparate treatment is justified by legitimate [current and
accurate] actuarial data, or by actual or reasonably anticipated experi-
ence, and.., conditions with comparable actuarial data and/or experi-
ence are treated in the same fashion;"' 31 or
3. no nondisability-based plan changes could be made to ensure
that the challenged plan "satisfies the commonly accepted or legally
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-3; see also United States v. State of Illi-
nois, No. 93-C-7741, filed Dec. 1993 (consent decree entered Aug. 1995) (reported at 6 NDLR
Highlights (Sept. 14, 1995)).
130. Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-3.
131. Id. (footnote omitted).
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required standards for the fiscal soundness of such a insurance
plan; ' 132 or
4. no nondisability-based plan change could be made "to prevent
the occurrence of an unacceptable change either in the coverage or
the health insurance plan, or in the [increased] premiums charged for
the health insurance plan" 33 or in increased co-payments or deduct-
ibles under the plan; or
5. denial of coverage is warranted in that the treatment does not
provide any benefit (unless the plan covers treatment of other condi-
tions having no medical value).' 34
Determining exactly what constitutes a subterfuge in violation of
the ADA will involve an individualized, case-by-case analysis. There
are, however, several existing areas of controversy surrounding the
subterfuge issue in the context of Title I.
1. Date of Plan's Enactment
The first question is whether insurance plans established prior to
the ADA's enactment can be found to constitute a subterfuge in viola-
tion of the ADA. In Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v.
Betts,135 the United States Supreme Court held that provisions in a
state retirement plan did not constitute a subterfuge in violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") 136 be-
cause the retirement plan was enacted prior to the enactment of the
ADEA. 137
In Modderno v. King,138 the District of Columbia Circuit followed
the reasoning of Betts when analyzing a case under ADA principles.
In Modderno, an insurance plan imposed a $75,000 lifetime cap on
benefits for mental health care but no cap on benefits for physical
care.139 The District of Columbia Circuit held that the cap did not
violate section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 40 which is to be inter-
preted in accord with ADA principles. 141 In so ruling, the court relied
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at E-3, E-5.
135. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
136. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
137. Betts, 492 U.S. at 167.
138. 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
139. Id. at 1060.
140. Section 504 was amended by the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992 to incorporate
the standards of Title I. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
141. Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1065 (interpreting section 504 by applying the standards under
ADA Title I).
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on Betts. Because the plan was enacted before the ADA, it was a
bona fide insurance plan, not a subterfuge to evade the ADA.
The court's reasoning in Modderno is in contravention of the legis-
lative history of the ADA and the EEOC's interpretation of section
501(c) of the ADA. The EEOC explains that the legislative history of
the ADA expressly states that "subterfuge is to be determined 're-
gardless of the date an insurance or employer benefit plan was
adopted."1 42 Thus, the EEOC states that the ADA does not provide
a "safe harbor" for health insurance adopted prior to the ADA's en-
actment on July 26, 1990.143 The EEOC opines that the Betts ration-
ale does not apply in Title I health insurance cases.144
In Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,145 the Sixth Circuit
followed the EEOC's reasoning and rejected the Modderno court's
application of the Betts "prior enactment" rationale in ADA cases. 146
The Sixth Circuit noted the legislative history indicating that the Betts
rationale should not apply under the ADA.147 To date, therefore,
there is a split of authority with respect to the question of whether the
ADA provides a safe harbor for health insurance (or disability plans)
enacted prior to the ADA's enactment.
2. Analysis of "Subterfuge": Part II of the Betts Dispute
In Betts,148 the Supreme Court defined subterfuge under the
ADEA as requiring a "scheme" used to discriminate "in some non-
fringe benefit aspect of the employment relationship.1 49 The EEOC
takes the position that the Betts rationale does not apply to Title I
cases 150 because Title I, unlike the ADEA, expressly provides that
employers may not discriminate with respect to the "fringe benefits"
of employment.' 51
142. Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-2. The EEOC cites the following legislative his-
tory: H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136-38 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 70-71
(1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 85 (1989).
143. Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-2.
144. Id. at E-3 n.10.
145. 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated, 6 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 547 (6th Cir. 1997).
146. Id. at 192-93.
147. Id. at 190-91. The court in Parker actually discussed the "safe harbor" issue in the con-
text of Title Il, rather than Title I. Nevertheless, the Parker court followed the EEOC's reason-
ing under Title I. Id.
148. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
149. Id. at 181.
150. Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-2.
151. Section 12112(b)(2) provides that an employer cannot enter into a contractual relation-
ship with "an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee" if the fringe benefits are
provided in a manner that discriminates on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2)
(1994).
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Some courts have rejected the EEOC's analysis and have applied
the Betts rationale to insurance cases filed under Title I. In Krauel v.
Iowa Methodist Medical Center,152 the Eighth Circuit upheld a lower
court's determination that an exclusion for the treatment of infertility
in a health insurance plan was not a subterfuge to evade the ADA.
Following Betts, the Eighth Circuit held that the "subterfuge" test
under the ADA requires proof of employment discrimination outside
the insurance plan.' 53 Since the plaintiff conceded that she suffered
no such discrimination, the Eighth Circuit held that the infertility ex-
clusion in the insurance plan was not a subterfuge. 54
Similarly, in Piquard v. City of East Peoria155 the district court fol-
lowed the Betts definition of "subterfuge.' 56 The court held the sub-
terfuge proviso inapplicable where police officers, who were not
permitted to participate in the city's police pension fund because of
their disabilities, "[did] not allege that they [were] being discriminated
against in a non-fringe benefit area of employment."'1 57 The court
seemed to go out of its way to reject the EEOC's definition of "sub-
terfuge"; the EEOC's definition applies to health insurance plans and
the issue in Piquard involved a pension plan. 158
To date, therefore, a conflict remains with respect to the question of
whether, to show subterfuge under Title I, the plaintiff must allege
discrimination in a non-fringe benefit aspect of employment. The leg-
islative history of the ADA, however, indicates that the Betts reason-
ing is not applicable to cases arising under the ADA.
3. Burden of Proving Subterfuge
If an employer-sponsored health insurance plan is challenged as be-
ing a subterfuge, the EEOC takes the position that the defendant-
employer bears the burden of proving the plan is not a subterfuge, in
accord "with the well-established principle that the burden of proof
should rest with the party who has the greatest access to the relevant
facts."' 59 The EEOC opines that since individual employees or job
152. 915 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affd, 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
153. Id. at 111.
154. Id.
155. 887 F. Supp. 1106, 1129 (C.D. 11. 1995).
156. Id. at 1122-25.
157. Id. at 1125.
158. Id.
159. Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-3.
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applicants have no access to the actuarial data of insurers, they are not
in a position to bear the burden of proving subterfuge. 160
In Betts, however, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who files
an action under the ADEA has the burden of proving that a benefit
plan is a subterfuge. 161 At least one court has applied the Betts ration-
ale under the ADA.1 62 This issue, therefore, also remains in dispute.
The EEOC's analysis clearly seems to be the appropriate one.
H. Case Example: Cochlear Implants
To illustrate how the insurance analysis works under Title I, I will
analyze whether restrictions on coverage for cochlear implants in an
employer-sponsored health insurance plan violate that Title.163
An emerging issue with respect to insurance coverage under Title I
involves coverage for cochlear implants. A cochlear implant is an
electronic prosthesis implanted into the inner ear that partially per-
forms the functions of the cochlea-that part "of the inner ear that
transduces sound waves into coded electrochemical signals.' 64 The
cochlear implant is intended to remedy many of the effects of nerve
deafness, the most common form of deafness. 65 Twenty-two elec-
160. Id. In Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1995), the court implic-
itly evidenced its agreement with the EEOC's position. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that her
employer's insurance plan violated Title I by denying coverage for chemotherapy for breast can-
cer under the reasoning that such treatment was experimental. Id. at 959. In reversing the de-
nial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the Eighth Circuit noted that Bodine
Aluminum had not presented any evidence to refute the plaintiffs assertion that the treatment
was not experimental. Id. at 961. The Eighth Circuit stated:
We do not believe it is unfair to expect Bodine and its sophisticated health insurance
providers to promptly provide some general evidence that [the treatment in dispute] is
not an accepted therapy for breast cancers like Henderson's. After all, such coverage
issues lie at the heart of a health insurance provider's expertise, and the evidence and
cases show that the issue of [such treatment] for breast cancer has been on the insur-
ance industry's horizon for some years.
Id. at 961 (citation omitted).
In Piquard v. City of East Peoria, 887 F. Supp. 1106 (C.D. I1. 1995), the court acknowledged
the EEOC's reasoning and stated that it would apply "with equal force" to a pension plan situa-
tion; however, the court noted that it did not have to determine the burden of proof issue in that
case since the court had already determined that no subterfuge could exist where a plan was
enacted prior to the ADA's enactment. Id. at 1125-26.
161. Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 182 (1989).
162. See, e.g., Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (placing the burden on the
plaintiff to prove subterfuge).
163. For example, Intergroup of Arizona's benefit plan provides: "Cochlear implants are ...
excluded [from coverage]." INTERGROUP OF ARIZONA, INC., EVIDENCE OF COVERAGE (insur-
ance policy on file with the DePaul Law Review).
164. Thomas Balkany, M.D., A Brief Perspective on Cochlear Implants, 328 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 281, 281 (1993).
165. Id.
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trodes are implanted into the inner ear and are attached via a magnet
and wires to an external processor. 166 In addition to the processor, the
implanted person wears a microphone to pick up sound. The external
processor sends coded information to the prosthesis in the inner ear,
which is a receiver-stimulator. The receiver-stimulator converts the
coded information into electrical signals, which are passed to the elec-
trodes. The electrodes stimulate hearing nerve fibers, and artificial
"sound" is transmitted directly to the brain, bypassing the nonfunc-
tioning portion of the ear.167
A cochlear implant is not a hearing aid, as the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration ("FDA") and the American Medical Association ex-
pressly recognize. 168 The implant involves major surgery and
continuous training and "remapping" of the processor to which the
implant attaches. Only people who are profoundly or very severly
deaf receive cochlear implants (pursuant to FDA rules)-the implant
serves no other purpose other than to help profoundly or very severly
deaf people, who cannot benefit substantially from hearing aids, to
hear.
Further, cochlear implants are not experimental. Over 8,000 people
in the United States have received cochlear implants, including sev-
eral thousand children. 169 This number is expected to increase due to
greatly expanded FDA approval with respect to the implantation of
both children and adults. Many thousands of individuals in other
countries have received cochlear implants.
An exemption for cochlear implants in a health insurance plan,
therefore, is clearly a disability-based distinction, as explained in the
EEOC's guidelines, since it is a nonexperimental medical procedure
that singles out a particular disability-deafness. This is only the first
part of the analysis, however. It next becomes necessary to analyze
whether this disability-based distinction for cochlear implants violates
Title I in that it constitutes a subterfuge to circumvent the purposes of
the ADA.
I will assume that the insurance plan exempting coverage for coch-
lear implants is a bona fide insurance plan that complies with state
law. Therefore, according to the EEOC's analysis, the insurer must
then show one of the following:
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Noel L. Cohen et al., A Prospective, Randomized Study of Cochlear Implants,
328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 233, 233 (1993).
168. Balkany, supra note 164, at 281.
169. This information was provided to the author by Cochlear Corporation and Advanced
Bionics, Inc.
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1. The insurer may show that the exemption is justified by legiti-
mate current actuarial data or by reasonably anticipated experience
and that conditions with comparable actuarial data or experience are
treated in the same manner. 170 It is hard to see how an insurer could
establish such justification with respect to cochlear implants, given
that analogous treatments that are equally or more expensive and
more prevalent (such as artificial hip joints and pacemakers) are rou-
tinely covered. 17'
2. The insurer may show that the exemption is necessary for the
fiscal soundness of the insurance plan.172 This would be virtually im-
possible for the insurer to establish. Given the relatively small
number of profoundly or severely deaf people in this country, and
particularly in a given area of the country, it seems impossible to see
how an insurer could become insolvent by paying for a minimal
number of cochlear implants.
3. The insurer may show that the exemption is necessary to avoid
drastic increases in insurance premiums or drastic reductions in the
numbers of people whom the insurer is either able to insure or who
wish to be insured by the insurer.173 Again, given the relatively small
number of people who will require cochlear implants in a given area,
this burden would be almost impossible to sustain.
170. Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-3.
171. Like artificial hip joints and pacemakers, cochlear implants are prosthetic devices. A
cochlear implant is implanted into the ear to simulate or regulate "hearing"; a pacemaker is
implanted into the heart to simulate or regulate the heartbeat; an artificial hip joint is implanted
into the hip to simulate and regulate hip movement. The average range of costs for a pace-
maker, including the equipment, surgery, medical and hospitalization costs, and follow-up care,
is estimated at between $17,000 and $55,000 (and an individual may receive numerous pacemak-
ers over a long period). The average range of costs for an artificial hip joint, including the
artificial joint, surgery, hospitalization, rehabilitation costs, and follow-up care, is estimated at
between $20,000 and $45,000. Both procedures can cost significantly more in special situations.
The average cost of a cochlear implant, including the equipment, surgery, medical and hospitali-
zation costs, and follow-up training, is estimated at between $35,000 and $40,000.
It is estimated that several million people in the United States have received pacemakers; the
number rises substantially each year. It is further estimated that between 120,000 and 170,000
artificial hip joints are implanted in the United States each year. The number of people in the
United States who are or will be eligible to receive cochlear implants is only a small fraction of
the number of people eligible to receive pacemakers or artificial hip joints. There are only an
estimated two million profoundly deaf people in the United States, and probably about the same
number or less of severely hearing-impaired people who cannot benefit substantially from hear-
ing aids. Only some of those individuals are candidates for cochlear implants.
The foregoing information regarding artificial hip joints and pacemakers is based on actuarial
data provided to the author by an insurance company representative.
172. Interim Guidance, supra note 42, at E-3.
173. Id.
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4. The insurer may show that cochlear implants do not provide
any benefit to people who are deaf.174 Since there are several thou-
sand deaf people in this country receiving very substantial benefits
from cochlear implants, 175 the insurer could not meet this burden.
Following this analysis, it is highly unlikely that an exemption for
cochlear implants in a health insurance plan would withstand scrutiny
under the ADA. Such an exemption should almost certainly consti-
tute an impermissible subterfuge to avoid the purposes of the ADA.
II. TITLE III-PULIC ACCOMMODATIONS
An individual who claims to have been discriminated against by vir-
tue of provisions in an employer-sponsored insurance plan may file
suit against the employer (under Title I), 176 the private insurance pro-
vider (under Title III),77 or both. An individual whose health or disa-
bility insurance is not provided via an employment relationship, but is
provided via contract between the individual and a private insurance
carrier, can only file suit against the insurance carrier under Title III.
A. Coverage Under Title III
As a preliminary matter, we must address the threshold issue of
when an insurer falls within the coverage of Title III. Title III of the
ADA prohibits discrimination on the "basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation."'' 78
A public accommodation is defined as a "private entity that owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."' 179
Title III contains a list of twelve categories of private entities that are
public accommodations governed by the ADA.180 Several examples
of covered entities are listed in each category.18'
174. Id.
175. The author is presently compiling data received from several hundred cochlear implant
recipients and parents of cochlear implant recipients that evidences the enormous benefit that
the majority of implantees receive from the implant. There are many publications explaining
such benefits. See, e.g., Cohen supra note 167 (illustrating a survey demonstrating substantial
beneficial results from the use of cochlear implants). The cochlear implant has enabled many
deaf people to return to the work force. An in-depth analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of
this Article.
176. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117 (1994).
177. Id. §§ 12181-12189.
178. Id. § 12182(a).
179. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1996).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
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To fall within Title III, a private entity must fall within one of those
twelve categories, 182 although the examples given in each category are
merely illustrative. One of the covered categories includes service es-
tablishments, defined as: "[a] laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber
shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor,
gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance of-
fice, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other
service establishment."1 83
The principal issue under Title III that this section of the Article
will address is whether the list of twelve categories includes only phys-
ical structures that a person enters to obtain goods or services or
whether the list also includes services provided by public accommoda-
tions even when clients or customers do not enter physical structures
to obtain such goods or services. 184 Clearly Title III applies to insur-
ance offices themselves because insurance offices are expressly listed
as being covered. 185 But does Title III apply to services provided by
insurers not involving access to insurance offices? This has been an
issue of dispute under Title III in general, not just with respect to serv-
ices provided by insurers. 186
The Title III regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice
("DOJ") indicate that Title III covers not only physical access to the
offices of insurance providers, but also the provision of services, such
as health or disability insurance benefits, offered by private insurance
companies. 187 The DOJ's Title III Technical Assistance Manual
states:
[A] public accommodation may offer [an insurance] plan that limits
certain kinds of coverage based on classification of risk, but may not
refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or limit the amount,
extent, or kind of coverage available to an individual, or charge a
different rate for the same coverage solely because of a physical or
mental impairment, except where the refusal, limitation, or rate dif-
ferential is based on sound actuarial principles or is related to actual
or reasonably anticipated experience.' 88
182. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
183. Id. § 12181(7)(F); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
184. See, e.g., Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, 37 F.3d 12,
18-20 (1st Cir. 1994).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
186. See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 18-20.
187. 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.20-36.23.
188. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr TITLE III TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL: COVERING PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES
(Nov. 1993) § 111-3.11000, at 19.
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This clearly implies that Title III goes beyond mere access to insur-
ance facilities.
Likewise, the First Circuit has held that Title III governs the activi-
ties of insurance companies, regardless of whether actual physical fa-
cilities are involved. 189 In Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v.
Automotive Wholesaler's Association of New England, 90 the district
court held that public accommodations under Title III are "limited to
actual physical structures with definite physical boundaries which a
person physically enters for the purpose of utilizing the facilities or
obtaining services therein."' 9' Thus, the district court held that a pri-
vate company that operates a self-insured employee benefit plan was
not a public accommodation within the meaning of Title 111.192 The
First Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court's dismissal of the
action, holding that the plain meaning of Title III evidences that pub-
lic accommodations are not limited to actual structures. 93 The First
Circuit noted:
By including "travel service" among the list of services considered
"public accommodations," Congress clearly contemplated that "ser-
vice establishments" include providers of services which do not re-
quire a person to physically enter an actual physical structure.
Many travel services conduct business by telephone or correspon-
dence without requiring their customers to enter an office in order
to obtain their services .... It would be irrational to conclude that
persons who enter an office to purchase services are protected by
the ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over the tel-
ephone or by mail are not. Congress could not have intended such
an absurd result.' 94
The First Circuit further noted that its interpretation is "consistent
with the legislative history of the ADA"'195 and stated:
Neither Title III nor its implementing regulations make any men-
tion of physical boundaries or physical entry. Many goods and serv-
ices are sold over the telephone or by mail with customers never
physically entering the premises of a commercial entity to purchase
the goods or services. To exclude this broad category of businesses
from the reach of Title III and limit the application of Title III to
physical structures which persons must enter to obtain goods and
services would run afoul of the purposes of the ADA and would
severely frustrate Congress's intent that individuals with disabilities
189. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 12.
190. 826 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.H. 1993), rev'd, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
191. Id. at 583.
192. Id. at 586.
193. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available
indiscriminately to other members of the general public.196
Other courts have agreed. In Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co.,1 9 7 the Sixth Circuit held that Title III "reach[es] the contents of
the goods and services," including insurance coverage, regardless of
whether physical facilities are at issue.198 The Sixth Circuit stated:
It seems unlikely that Congress would leave the insurance industry
virtually untouched by a statute that is designed to address "the ma-
jor areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabili-
ties." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) ("Purpose"). There could hardly be
a "good" or "service" more central to the day-to-day life of a seri-
ously disabled person than insurance-for it is often insurance cov-
erage that will determine a disabled person's ability to prevent the
disability from limiting his or her participation in society. 199
Similarly, in Kotev v. First Colony Life Insurance Co.,200 the court
held that the protection of Title III goes beyond mere access to facili-
ties and includes access to nondiscriminatory insurance coverage.20
That court noted that section 501(c) of the ADA, which prohibits in-
surers from engaging in practices that constitute a subterfuge to avoid
the ADA but allows insurers to limit coverage based on sound actua-
rial principles, would be unnecessary "if insurers could never be liable
under Title III for conduct such as the discriminatory denial of insur-
ance coverage. '202
Apparently, at least in the insurance context, the courts seem to
have gotten past the "physical premises" argument, and thus insurers
should be bound by Title III with respect to coverage issues. That
brings us to the next issue: What kind of substantive analysis will be
conducted under Title III to see if provisions in a health insurance or
disability plan constitute a subterfuge in violation of the ADA?
196. Id. at 20.
197. 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated, 6 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 547 (6th Cir. 1997).
198. Id. at 187.
199. Id. at 192-93.
200. 927 F. Supp. 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
201. Id. at 1321.
202. Id. at 1322; see also Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1197 (D.N.H.
1996) (following Carparts and noting that the "broad wording" of Title III evidences that it "was
intended to extend beyond mere access or availability of a good or service"); Baker v. Hartford
Life Ins. Co., No. 94-C-4416, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14103, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995)
(finding that the insurance company was subject to Title Ill despite the fact that plaintiff had no
contact with the company's offices).
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B. Substantive Analysis Under Title III
Unlike the EEOC, which has promulgated comprehensive guide-
lines to assist in determining whether distinctions or exemptions in
health insurance plans violates Title 1,203 the DOJ has not issued gui-
dance indicating when such distinctions or exemptions should be held
to violate Title III. An attorney with the DOJ has informed this com-
mentator, however, that with respect to health insurance plans, the
DOJ is following, and will continue to follow, the EEOC's guide-
lines.20 4 Like the EEOC with respect to Title I, the DOJ has not yet
taken any position with respect to when, or whether, distinctions or
exemptions in long-term disability policies will violate Title III. To
date, the courts have just begun to address these questions under Title
111.205
CONCLUSION
The relationship between the ADA and matters of insurance raises
a multitude of questions. Numerous issues of dispute remain under
Title I with respect to insurance coverage, including: (i) whether indi-
viduals can sue their former employers for allegedly discriminatory
provisions in insurance or disability plans; (ii) whether the ADA pro-
vides a "safe harbor" for insurance or disability plans established prior
to the ADA's enactment; (iii) whether distinctions in benefits between
treatment for physical and mental health conditions in an insurance or
disability plan constitute disability-based distinctions that may violate
the ADA; (iv) whether, to prove subterfuge under section 501(c), a
203. See generally Interim Guidance, supra note 42.
204. Telephone Interview with Philip Breen, Esq., Special Litigation Counsel, Civil Rights
Division, United States Dep't of Justice (Jan. 22, 1997).
205. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 193-94 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated, 6
Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 547 (6th Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit appeared to follow the
EEOC's reasoning. The court held that, on remand, the plaintiff will have to show that the
alleged discriminatory distinction in a long-term disability plan (between mental and physical
health coverage) is not justified by "sound actuarial principles" or "actual or reasonably antici-
pated experience" or "bona fide risk classification." The court noted:
It is not the role of the courts to write insurance policies. Title IV [of the ADA] clearly
places a significant amount of discretion in the hands of insurance companies to write
policies that are "consistent with state law." .... Thus, .... insurance practices, includ-
ing the insurance industry's justification for its distinction between mental and physical
disabilities, are therefore protected to the extent they are in accord with sound actua-
rial principles, reasonably anticipated experience and bona fide risk classification.
Id. at 194 (citation omitted).
In Doukas, the court determined that a factual issue existed with respect to the question of
whether the insurer's denial of mortgage disability insurance to an individual with bipolar disor-
der was based on actual or reasonably anticipated experience relating to bipolar disorder. 882 F.
Supp. at 1200-01.
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plaintiff must have suffered discrimination in a non-fringe benefit as-
pect of employment; (v) whether the burden of proving or disproving
subterfuge lies with the plaintiff or the defendant; and (vi) whether,
and to what extent, coverage exclusions or benefit caps will constitute
subterfuges in violation of the ADA.
All these areas of dispute, except the first and fourth, also apply
with respect to Title III. Under Title III, however, it seems well set-
tled that services provided by private insurers are covered under the
ADA regardless of whether access to the insurer's premises is in-
volved. A major area of concern under both Titles I and III, which to
date no regulatory agency has addressed, is the extent-if any-to
which long-term disability plans may be held to violate the ADA.
The underlying issue is one of policy. To what extent is the ADA
intended to regulate-or have an impact on-the insurance industry?
There are those who argue that insurance matters lie almost entirely
outside the scope of the ADA, and that the insurance industry should
be regulated solely by the states and not directly impacted by federal
civil rights laws. Others argue that insurance coverage is central to the
ability of persons with disabilities to integrate into mainstream society
and, for this reason, is an important aspect of the ADA. The legisla-
tive history of the ADA, as well as section 501(c) of the Act, expressly
recognizes that the ADA is intended to have some impact on the pro-
visions of insurance benefits for people with disabilities. It remains to
be seen how the policy disputes will be reconciled and what impact the
ADA will have on insurance coverage.
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